Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the Doe Nuclear Weapons Complex: (Abbreviated Version) by National Research Council of the National Academies

Author:National Research Council of the National Academies
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Conflict and Security Issues : Weapons and Technology
Publisher: NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Published: 2011-04-07T00:00:00+00:00

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section, the committee describes and briefly explains the key recommendations contained in the committee’s report. The committee’s work also resulted in a number of findings, that were judged to be too sensitive to reproduce in this abbreviated version. The findings are included in the full version of the report, entitled Understanding and Managing Risk in the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, which is exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).

RECOMMENDATION 3-1: The committee advises against the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in designing security for the DOE nuclear weapons complex at this time. However, the committee recommends the use of some tools and techniques traditionally associated with PRA to improve NNSA’s understanding of the full spectrum of risks to the complex.

RECOMMENDATION 3-2: NNSA should utilize relevant techniques traditionally associated with risk assessment to improve its understanding of risk—specifically including an analysis of the security system—along with creative scenario generation techniques and security best practices.

RECOMMENDATION 4-1: The committee recommends that DOE/NNSA generate a range of plausible and specific objectives that the site security system is intended to preclude, for use in scenario generation. An adversary perspective should be taken into account when generating these objectives.

RECOMMENDATION 4-2: The committee recommends that a comprehensive and plausible range of adversary capabilities, strategies, and tactics be considered in defining the threat to sites and designing security systems.

RECOMMENDATION 4-3: The committee recommends that DOE sites regularly track and evaluate the information available to an adversary and use this information to improve their understanding of the most likely ways an adversary might attack a given site or other operations, such as transportation.

RECOMMENDATION 4-4: The committee recommends that DOE sites supplement their current vulnerability assessment processes with creative scenario generation techniques.

RECOMMENDATION 4-5: The committee recommends that DOE Headquarters take on the responsibility of defining an overall deterrence strategy for the nuclear weapons complex, subject to evaluation by deterrence subject-matter experts.

RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The committee recommends that DOE focus its communication efforts aimed at Congress and the administration on risk management rather than on the risk to the nuclear weapons complex. This communication should draw on the total systems approach and scenario generation processes recommended by the committee.

RECOMMENDATION 5-2: The committee recommends that DOE take steps to ensure a more integrated and collaborative environment for functional responsibility for the security system at the headquarters level and in the field. A clearer and more expeditious process for accepting risk should be a priority goal.

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